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Abstract: 
Using cross-country and panel regressions, we investigate to what extent gender gaps in 
education and employment (proxied using gender gaps in labor force participation) 
reduce economic growth.  Using most recent data and investigating a long time period 
(1960-2000), we update the results of previous studies on education gaps on growth and 
extend the analysis to employment gaps using panel data.  We find that gender gaps in 
education and employment significantly reduce economic growth.   The combined ‘costs’ 
of education and employment gaps in Middle East and North Africa and South Asia 
amount respectively to 0.9-1.7 and 0.1-1.6 percentage point differences in growth 
compared to East Asia.  Gender gaps in employment appear to have an increasing effect 
on economic growth differences between regions, with the Middle East and North Africa 
and South Asia suffering from slower growth in female employment.   
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1. Introduction 
  There are many reasons to be concerned about existing gender inequalities in 
important well-being related dimensions such as education, health, employment, or pay.  
From a well-being as well as an equity perspective, such gender inequalities are 
problematic as they lower well-being and are a form of injustice in most conceptions of 
equity or justice.
2  While such a view would argue for reducing gender inequalities in 
these dimensions of well-being on intrinsic grounds, recently a literature has developed 
that has investigated the instrumental effects of gender inequality on other important 
development outcomes with a particular focus on economic growth.  Without denying the 
importance of reducing gender inequality on intrinsic grounds, this paper is a contribution 
to that latter literature. 
A significant focus of that literature has been to examine the impact of gender 
inequality in education on economic growth.  A number of theoretical contributions have 
suggested a negative link between gender inequality and economic growth (e.g. Oded 
Galor and David Weil 1996; Nils-Petter Lagerlöf 2003).  This literature shows that, 
largely due to the impact of female education on fertility and the creation of human 
capital of the next generation, a lower gender gap will spur economic development.  The 
next section will briefly summarize the main findings from that literature.  
In parallel, an empirical literature has also examined these effects.  While some 
earlier studies had suggested that gender inequality in education might actually increase 
economic growth (Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee 1994; Barro and Xavier Sala-I-
Martin 1995), more recent work has shown that the opposite appears to be the case (Anne 
Hill and Elizabeth King 1995; David Dollar and Roberta Gatti 1999; Kristin Forbes 2000; 
Stephen Knowles, Paula Lorgelly and Dorian Owen 2002; Stephan Klasen 2002; Steven 
Yamarik and Sucharita Ghosh 2003; Dina Abu-Ghaida and Klasen  2004).  These studies 
not only differed from previous analyses in their findings of the impact of gender 
inequality on economic growth, but also were able to explain why earlier studies had 
found the opposite effect and why more careful econometric techniques yielded the new 
finding that gender inequality in education reduces economic growth.
3 
                                                 
2 See Klasen and Wink (2003) and Klasen (2002, 2007) for a discussion of these issues.   
3 Among the problems in the findings by Barro and co-authors identified by these studies were the absence 
of regional dummy variables, particularly for Latin America and East Asia.  In the former, low initial 
gender gaps were accompanied by low growth, while in the latter relatively high initial gender gaps were 
accompanied by high subsequent growth.  In the absence of regional dummy variables, a causal link is 
made between these associations.  It is quite likely, however, that the growth experiences of these regions 
were also influenced by other region-specific factors that are largely unrelated to gender gaps.  The fact that 
these regional dummies are (at least jointly) significant and that then the negative effect of female 
education reverses itself once regional (or country fixed) effects are considered supports this view.  Further 
problems with these studies are the use of initial period education variables, the high collinearity between   3
These macro studies are also consistent with findings using micro data showing 
that girls have a higher marginal return to education, which is even higher if the impact of 
female education on fertility and education of the next generation is included (Hill and 
King 1995; World Bank 2001; King, Klasen, and Maria Porter 2008). 
  The effects found are quite large for the regions where gender inequality is 
sizable, such as South Asia or the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  In fact, 
Klasen (2002) estimated that 0.9 percentage points of the 1.8 percentage point annual per 
capita growth difference between the countries in MENA and those in East Asia and the 
Pacific can be attributed to higher initial gender inequality in education there as well as a 
slower closing of the gap vis-à-vis East Asia and the Pacific.
4 
  While these results are instructive, they are based on information on education 
and economic performance until 1990.  Recently, new data on education achievement and 
economic performance have become available that now stretch to 2000 so that one 
purpose of the paper is to update the findings of the impact of gender inequality on 
economic growth.  We will do this by using an updated and extended data set and the 
same econometric specification that was used in Klasen (2002).  For some regions 
(including the MENA region), an update is particularly germane as the gender gaps in 
education have been closing more rapidly recently so that one would expect smaller but 
still remarkable costs for the existing gender gap in education.   
  A subject that has not been investigated in great detail is the impact of gender 
inequality in employment and pay on economic growth.  The relatively small theoretical 
literature on the subject yields conflicting results (e.g. Robert Blecker and Stephanie 
Seguino 2002; Berta Esteve-Volart 2004; Tiago de Cavalcanti and Jose Tavares 2007).  
While there is some empirical literature suggesting that high earnings gaps, combined 
with high female labour force participation rates, helped spur export-oriented economic 
growth in some Asian countries (e.g. Stephanie Seguino 2000a, b; Matthias Busse and 
Christian Spielmann 2006), there has not been a thorough empirical investigation of the 
role of gender gaps in employment on economic growth and the few studies existing have 
to be treated with caution due to problems of endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and 
poor data availability and quality.  
These issues can best be treated in a panel framework, where one considers the 
impact of initial employment on subsequent economic growth, and thus can at least partly 
address issues of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneneity.  Unfortunately, such 
panel data is only available for labour force participation rates by sex, not for 
employment by sex; we show below, however, that available data suggest that gender 
                                                                                                                                                 
male and female education, and the endogeneity of these variables.  For a discussion of these issues, see 
Dollar and Gatti (1999), Lorgelly and Owen (1999), Forbes (2000) and Klasen (2002),  
4 The reported figures in Klasen (2002) are actually slightly different, as Israel, Sudan, and Turkey were all 
included in the Middle East Region.  For this report, they were allocated to other regions (Israel to OECD, 
Turkey to Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Sudan to Sub Saharan Africa) and therefore the analysis in 
Klasen (2002) was redone to reflect this.  The figures reported above are based on that analysis.      4
gaps in labor force participation and employment are closely correlated so that one can 
well proxy for the other.  With forty years of data, an analysis of the gender gaps in 
labour force participation is now possible and therefore a second aim of the paper is to 
investigate the impact of gender gaps in labour force participation (as a proxy for gender 
gaps in employment) on economic growth in such a panel framework.     
 
 2. Gender Inequality and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence 
 
  There have been a number of theoretical and empirical studies finding that gender 
inequality in education and employment reduce economic growth.
5  The main arguments 
from the literature, which are discussed in detail in Klasen (1999, 2002, 2006) are briefly 
summarized below.   
  Regarding gender inequality in education, the theoretical literature suggests as a 
first argument that such gender inequality reduces the average amount of human capital 
in a society and thus harms economic performance.  It does so as by artificially restricting 
the pool of talent from which to draw for education and thereby excluding highly 
qualified girls (and taking less qualified boys instead, e.g. Dollar and Gatti, 1999).  
Moreover, if there are declining marginal returns to education, restricting the education of 
girls to lower levels while taking the education of boys to higher levels means that the 
marginal return to educating girls is higher than that of boys and thus would boost overall 
economic performance (World Bank 2001; Knowles et al. 2002). 
  A second argument relates to externalities of female education.  Promoting female 
education is known to reduce fertility levels, reduce child mortality levels, and promote 
the education of the next generation.  Each factor in turn has a positive impact on 
economic growth.  Thus gender gaps in education reduce the benefits to society of high 
female education (e.g. Galor and Weil 1996; Lagerlöf 1999; World Bank 2001; King, 
Klasen, and Porter 2008).  There is also an important timing issue involved here.  
Reduced fertility levels will, after some twenty years, lead to a favourable demographic 
constellation which Bloom and Williamson (1998) refer to as a ‘demographic gift’.  For a 
period of several decades, the working age population will grow much faster than overall 
population, thus lowering dependency rates with positive repercussions for per capita 
economic growth.
6   
  A third argument relates to international competitiveness.  Many East Asian 
countries have been able to be competitive on world markets through the use of female-
intensive export-oriented manufacturing industries, a strategy that is now finding 
followers in South Asia and individual countries across the developing world (e.g. 
Seguino, 2000a, b).
7  In order for such competitive export industries to emerge and grow, 
women need to be educated and there must no barrier to their employment in such 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004), Klasen (2006), Janet Stotsky (2006) and Mark 
Blackden et al (2007), for a review.   
6 See Bloom and Williamson (1998) and Klasen (2002) for a full exposition of these arguments.   
7 Klasen (2006) reviews the literature and also notes that such strategies have now been extended, with 
some success to countries sich as Tunisia, Bangladesh, China, and Vietnam.     5
sectors.  Gender inequality in education and employment would reduce the ability of 
countries to capitalize on these opportunities (World Bank 2001; Busse and Spielmann 
2006).
8     
  Regarding gender gaps in employment, there are a number of closely related 
arguments.  First, there is a similar argument that it imposes a distortion on the economy 
as do gender gaps in education.  It artificially reduces the pool of talent from which 
employers can draw upon, thereby reducing the average ability of the workforce (e.g. 
Esteve-Volart 2004).  Such distortions would not only affect dependent employed, but 
similar arguments could be made for self-employed in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors where unequal access to critical inputs, technologies, and resources would reduce 
the average productivity of these ventures thereby reducing economic growth (see Mark 
Blackden et al 2007).   As self-employment (including in agriculture) is included in our 
empirical assessment, these arguments might have some empirical relevance in 
accounting for the results.    
  A second also closely related argument suggests that gender inequality in 
employment can reduce economic growth via demographic effects.  A model by 
Cavalcanti and Tavares (2007) suggest that gender inequality in employment would be 
associated with higher fertility levels which in turn reduce economic growth. 
  Thirdly, the results by Seguino (2000a, b) on the impact of gender gaps in pay on 
international competitiveness imply that gender gaps in employment access would also 
reduce economic growth as it would deprive countries to use (relatively cheap) female 
labour as a competitive advantage in an export-oriented growth strategy.    
A fourth argument relates to the importance of female employment and earnings 
for their bargaining power within families.  There is a sizable literature that demonstrates 
that female employment and earnings increase their bargaining power in the home (e.g. 
Amartya Sen 1990; Thomas Duncan 1997; Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott, and 
Harold Alderman 1997; World Bank 2001; Stephan Klasen and Claudia Wink 2003; 
King, Klasen, and Porter 2008).  This not only benefits the women concerned, but their 
greater bargaining power can have a range of growth-enhancing effects.  These could 
include higher savings as women and men differ in their savings behaviour (e.g. 
Stephanie Seguino and Maria Sagrario Floro 2003), more productive investments and use 
and repayment of credit (see Janet Stosky 2006), and higher investments in the health and 
education of their children, thus promoting human capital of the next generation and 
therefore economic growth (e.g. Thomas 1997; World Bank 2001).  
  A fifth argument relates to governance.  There is a growing but still rather 
speculative and suggestive literature that has collated evidence that workers, on average, 
appear to be less prone to corruption and nepotism than men (World Bank 2001; Anand 
                                                 
8 There is also some empirical support for the claim by Seguino (2000a, b) that higher gender wage gaps 
were a further pre-condition of these export-oriented strategies.  There is a related debate as to whether 
growth has reduced these gender wage gaps, which appears to be the case in many, but not all countries; 
also, they remain large, particularly when controlling for education.  For a discussion, see Seguino (2000a, 
b), Klasen (2002), Busse and Spielmann (2006) and Stotsky, (2006), among others.      6
Swamy, Omar Azfar, Stephen  Knack and Young Lee 2001).   If these findings prove to 
be robust, greater female employment might be beneficial for economic performance in 
this sense as well.
9   
  There is a related theoretical literature that examines the impact of gender 
discrimination in pay on economic performance.  Here the theoretical literature is quite 
divided.  On the one hand, studies by Galor and Weil (1996) and Calvalcanti and Tavares 
(2007) suggest that large gender pay gaps will reduce economic growth.  Such gender 
pay gaps reduce female employment, increase fertility, and lower economic growth 
through these participation and demographic effects.  In contrast, Blecker and Seguino 
(2002) highlight a different mechanism, leading to contrasting results.  They suggest that 
high gender pay gaps and associated low female wages increase the competitiveness of 
export-oriented industrializing economies and thus boost the growth performance of these 
countries.  The most important difference of this study, in contrast to the models 
considered above, is that it is focusing more on short-term demand-induced growth 
effects, while the other models are long-term growth models where growth is driven by 
supply constraints.  Clearly both effects can be relevant, depending on the time horizon 
considered, an issue that is also discussed briefly below.         
  It is important to point out that it is theoretically not easy to separate the effects 
between gender gaps in education, employment, and pay.  In fact, in most of the models 
considered above, gender gaps in one dimension tend to lead to gender gaps in other 
dimensions, with the causality running in both directions.
10  For example, gender gaps in 
education might automatically lead to gender gaps in employment, particularly in the 
formal sector, where employers will prefer educated workers and thus will not consider 
applications of uneducated women.  Conversely, if there are large barriers to female 
employment or gender gaps in pay, rational parents (and girls) might decide that 
education of girls is not as lucrative which might therefore lead to lower demands for 
female education and resulting gender gaps in education.
11  Thus gender gaps in 
education and employment are closely related to each other.
12   
                                                 
9 See a related discussion in King, Klasen, and Porter (2008) about the growth and welfare effects of 
women as policy-makers.   The ‘causes’ of these differences in behavior may well be related to different 
socialization of girls and boys, a subject that leads beyond the scope of this paper.   
10 The one exception are again the two short-term structuralists models of Blecker and Seguino (2002) 
where large gender gaps in pay, implicitly combined combined with no gender gaps in education and 
employment, can deliver the income-enhancing effects;  
11 On these issues, see discussions in King and Hill (1993), Alderman et al. (1995, 1996), and World Bank 
(2001)   
12 Also, it is not obvious which factor is the prime cause of gender gaps that one should then include in a 
reduced form estimation.     7
They are not measuring the same thing, however, and thus are important to 
investigate separately.  For one, it might be the case that the two issues are largely driven 
by institutional factors that govern education and employment access and do not therefore 
greatly depend on each other.  For example, one might think of an education policy that 
strives to achieve universal education and thus reduces gender gaps, while there continue 
to be significant barriers to employment for females in the labour market.  This might be 
particularly relevant to the situation in the Middle East and North Africa but most 
recently also for South Asia.  Moreover, the externalities of female education and female 
employment are not all the same.  For example, female education is likely to lead to 
lower fertility and child mortality of the off-spring, while the effect of female 
employment on these items is likely to be much smaller and more indirect (working 
mainly through greater female bargaining power; and there may be also be opposite 
effects including that the absence of women in the home might in some cases negatively 
impact on the quality of child care).  Conversely, the governance externality applies 
solely to female employment, not to female education.   
  On the empirical evidence, there is a considerable literature now documenting that 
gender gaps in education reduce economic growth.  King and Hill (1993) as well as 
Knowles et al. (2002) use a Solow-growth framework and find that gender gaps in 
education significantly reduce the level of GDP.  Dollar and Gatti (1999), Forbes (2000), 
Yamarik and Ghosh (2003), Appiah and McMahon (2002) and Klasen (2002) investigate 
the impact of gender gaps on economic growth and all find that gender gaps in education 
have a negative impact on subsequent economic growth.  They also find that the earlier 
results by Barro and Lee (1994) that female education might negatively impact economic 
growth do not stand up to closer econometric scrutiny.   
  There are much fewer empirical studies on the impact of gender gaps in 
employment and pay on economic growth, largely related to data and econometric issues 
discussed above.  Klasen (1999) found that increases in female labor force participation 
and formal sector employment were associated with higher growth in a cross-country 
context.   Differences in female participation and employment might have accounted for 
another 0.3 percentage points in the growth difference between the MENA region and 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP).  But these findings have to be treated with caution as 
they may suffer from reverse causality.  In particular, it might be the case that high 
growth draws women into the labor force (rather than increasing female participation 
promoting economic growth).  There are no easy ways to correct for this econometrically 
as there are unlikely to be valid instruments that can be used.  Also, there are questions 
about the international comparability of data on labor force participation and formal 
sector employment rates.  To the extent that the problems of comparability affect levels 
but not trends over time, these problems might be avoided in a fixed effects panel setting 
as the one we are undertaking here.   
At the sub-national level, Berta Esteve-Volart has found significant negative 
effects of gender gaps in employment and managerial positions on economic growth of 
India’s states using panel data and controlling for endogeneity using instrumental 
variables (Esteve-Volart, 2004).      
  There are some papers by Seguino (2000a, b) that support the contention that the 
combination of low gender gaps in education and employment with large gender gaps in 
pay (and resulting low female wages) were a contributing factor to the growth experience   8
of export-oriented middle income countries.  Supporting this empirical claim is a paper 
by Busse and Spielman (2006) which finds for a sample of 23 developing countries that a 
combination of low gender gaps in education and employment and large gender gaps in 
pay helped promote exports.  Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive, standardized 
and comparable data on gender pay gaps across many countries so that these analyses 
have been based on relatively small and rather specific samples of countries.
13     
  Also empirically, there are some questions about separation of the effects of 
gender gaps in education and labor force participation or employment.  In regressions that 
only consider the effect of gender gaps in education, they might implicitly also measure 
the impact of gender gaps in employment, particularly if the two are highly correlated.  
Such high correlation might also make it difficult to separately identify the effects when 
both are included in a regression (due to the multicollinearity problem).
14  Also, it will be 
difficult to assess which of the two is the causal driver of the other, given the close and 
plausible theoretical and empirical linkage.   
  In sum, there is considerable theoretical support for the notion that gender gaps in 
education and employment are likely to reduce economic performance (while the 
literature on the effect of gender pas in pay is more divided).  The empirical results also 
point to negative effects of gender gaps in education, but there is little reliable cross-
country evidence on gender gaps in employment.  In the following section we will 
discuss gender gaps in education and employment by developing region before 
estimating the impact of these gaps on economic performance there.   
 
3. Education, Labor Force Participation, Employment, and Economic Performance  
 
In this section we will present data on growth, education, labor force participation, 
and employment of the different world regions with particular focus on the Middle East 
and North Africa Region (MENA)
15, Sub Saharan Africa, and South Asia, the areas with 
particularly high gender gaps in education and/or employment.  The data sources and 
definitions are shown in Table 1.   
                                                 
13 In the case of these papers, the focus on semi-industrialized, export-oriented countries was intended.  But 
this can therefore not address the question whether there is a more general relationship between pay gaps 
and growth in developing countries that do not belong to this small group.   
14 It turns out that in our total sample, gender gaps in education and employment are not very closely 
correlated so that it should be possibly to separately identify the effects.  This overall low correlation is 
largely driven by a negative correlation between gender gaps in education and employment in Sub Saharan 
Africa and, to a lesser extent, South Asia, while in the other regions, the correlation is positive and usually 
large and significant.    This negative correlation in Sub Saharan Africa is related to high female 
employment in agriculture despite low levels of female education; in this case, low education is not a 
barrier to high female employment as is the case elsewhere (in the formal sector in Africa, see Klasen 2006; 
Blackden et al. 2007) 
15 See Annexes for the list of countries per region for which we have data availability.   9
 
Table 1: Variables names, definition and data source (entire page) 
 
As shown in figure 1, the fastest-growing region in the past forty years according 
to our data set has been the region of East Asia and the Pacific. The real per capita annual 
growth rate between 1960 and 2000 in this region was 4.05%. On the contrary, the region 
that registered least growth is the Sub-Saharan Africa region (0.57%). Latin American 
and Caribbean countries (LAC) did not experience high growth rates either: they grew 
1.53% annually. Middle East and OECD countries’ growth rates are in-between at 2.24% 
and 2.66% annual growth per capita, respectively.  To better analyze the pattern of the 
per capita growth rate we will decompose it in decades for the past forty years (1960s-
1970s-1980s and 1990s) and consider the different world’s regions growth rates in the 
different decades. 
 
Figure1: Real Regional per capita annual growth rate 1960-2000 (less than half 
page) 
 
Considering the growth rate per decade in figure 2 allows us to take into account 
the growth rates of Eastern Europe (ECA), because after 1990 the data available for this 
region increases significantly. During the nineties those countries were in transition and 
their rate of per capita growth was very low (0.26%).  But also in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
annual per capita growth rate decreased in the last 4 decades and actually shows negative 
growth in the 1990s (-0.21).   
 
Figure 2: Real Regional per capita annual growth rate per decade (less than half a 
page) 
 
In other world regions the per capita growth rate was generally higher in the 
1960s and 1970s and then it decreased in the 1980s and 1990s with the exception of the 
South Asia region (SA) where the annual growth rate grew quickly in 1980s and was 
maintained almost at the same level in the 1990s. This result was largely driven by India 
and Sri Lanka. But their neighbors (EAP countries) still remain the countries that 
experience largely higher annual per capita growth rate in each decade. The region of 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) together with Latin America seems to be 
successfully recovering from very low growth in the 1980s.  One should point out that the 
data for the Middle East and North Africa included in the analysis do not consider many 
of the oil-exporting Arab states including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, and Libya 
for which no income data over time.
16  Nevertheless, the growth experience there is to a 
                                                 
16 Also note that following the World Bank country classification system, Turkey is considered to belong to 
the Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Israel to OECD.    10
considerable extent influenced by the direct and indirect impact of oil prices on oil-
producing (and neighboring) countries.
17   
  Non-economic indicators of well-being show a similar pattern, although some 
differences emerge (Appendix Table1).  The three indicators shown, under five mortality, 
fertility, and life expectancy all show larger improvements than the income measures.  
But the pace of improvements is similar to the growth indicator, with East Asia and 
Pacific showing the fastest improvements on most indicators, while Sub Saharan Africa 
showing the slowest.  Here the MENA region compares very favorably with rapid 
improvements in life expectancy and under five mortality, and large reductions in 
fertility, particularly in the past 20 years while in South Asia the improvement was 
generally smaller.  
   Turning to the indicators of concern here, gender inequality in education, labor 
force participation, and employment, in the appendix Tables A.2 and A.3 show the 
development in the regions between 1960 and 2000 by decade.  The tables show that in 
all the regions, the education level of the adult population has increased considerably 
since 1960.  Male and female adults have between 1.8 and 4.4 more years of education in 
2000 than in 1960, with Sub Saharan Africa showing the slowest progress and East Asia 
and the MENA region the fastest.  Regarding gender inequality, the data show 
considerable gender inequality in education in 1960 in most regions.  The worst affected 
were South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, and the MENA region, where female adults had 
about half or less the education level than their male peers.  In all regions, this gap has 
been reduced, but the gap remains sizable in some.  In South Asia, female adults still only 
have about 60% of the educational achievement of males, and the gap has closed quite 
slowly in Sub Saharan Africa.  The gaps have been closing faster in East Asia and Pacific 
and also in the MENA region where female adults (15 and older) now have about 73% of 
the education of males.   
  Appendix Table A.3 examines data on labor force participation rates by gender, 
the female share of the labor force, and the rates of formal sector employment.  The data 
show that inequality in labor force participation is also considerable, although the gaps 
have been narrowing. From these data a consistent pattern emerges.  In particular, East 
Asia and the Pacific as well as Latin America show rapidly declining gender gaps in 
labor force participation and formal sector employment; Sub Saharan Africa show 
declines in female labor force participation, but from a high level
18; and the MENA 
region has the lowest female labor force participation rate and formal sector participation 
                                                 
17 Iran is the only major oil producer included in the sample, but Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen also depend, 
directly or indirectly (via migration and remittances) on oil-production.   
18 Sub Saharan Africa’s high female labor participation rate is largely confined to the agricultural sector 
which still employs the majority of workers in most Sub Saharan African countries.  The international 
comparability of labor force participation data in own-account agriculture is particularly problematic.  In 
formal sector employment, female employment rates are much lower and the gender gap is significant; but 
these data are, as discussed, missing for many countries and show consistency and comparability problems.     11
of women throughout the period.  As in other regions, in MENA the gaps in labor force 
participation rates have also narrowed in recent decades, but by less than most other 
regions.
19  In South Asia the gender gap in labor force participation in the past four 
decades was only marginally reduced. 
  From our theoretical discussion, we would expect that excluding women from the 
pool of talent is particularly damaging formal sector employment which may depend 
predominantly on having the best talent.  Thus using the gender gap in formal sector 
employment might be most appropriate.  On the other hand, these data are available from 
the ILO for a much smaller pool of countries and it appears that measurement error and 
international comparability is particularly problematic using these data.  Therefore for the 
empirical analysis that follows, we will use the gender gaps in labor force participation 
only.  
Even if formal sector employment data are not readily available and comparable, 
one might still want to use overall the employment rate (i.e. employed women as a share 
of the working-age population) rather than labor force participation data as the presumed 
theoretical effects are related to employment rather than participation.  The difference 
between the two is, of course, the unemployment rates.  While we do not have reliable 
employment data at the national level, the KILM data of the ILO (ILO, 2007) suggest 
that, first, unemployment rates are below 10% in all regions except the MENA region 
(where they are believed to hover around 12-14%), and that, second, the differences in 
male and female unemployment rates are quite low (usually less than 1 percentage point) 
so that labor force participation data appear to be reasonable proxies for employment 
levels by sex.
20  Thus we believe that the data on gender gaps in labor force participation 
rates will be reasonable proxies for gender gaps in overall employment rates.   
In general, however, the quality and comparability also of the ILO labor force 
data is open to question.  The data are estimates based sometimes on very patchy primary 
data.  The comparability problems are likely to be larger in level differences across 
countries than in trends over time.  Despite these problems, we are forced to rely on the 
available ILO labor force data as the only available cross-country panel data for our 
                                                 
19 The combination of rapidly shrinking gender gaps in education yet large and persistent gender gaps in 
employment in the MENA region constitutes a major puzzle.  See World Bank (2004) for a careful 
discussion.    
20 Unemployment rates for females in Latin America and in the Middle East and North Africa are several 
points higher than for males.  Thus in these regions, the gender gap in employment is actually slightly 
larger than in labor force participation.  But as this gender gap in unemployment rates is rather stable over 
time, it would be absorbed by the country-specific effects in our panel estimation.  We also tried to use 
sectoral employment data that is available for some countries since the 1980s to adjust our labor force 
participation data to focus on non-agricultural employment.  But there were so many data gaps and 
measurement error and comparability was so severe that these data turned out to be unusable.        12
analysis. Inherent measurement error in all the labor force estimates leads to the well-
known downward bias of coefficients in regression analyses.  Thus any effect that we 
find is likely to understate the true extent of the effect. Unfortunately, it is very difficult 
to econometrically control for measurement error.  We know little about its structure, nor 
are there good instruments to address it.  We hope that our panel analyses will at least 
partly reduce this problem to the extent that measurement error and comparability 
problems are lower across time than they are across space and can therefore be partly 
controlled for by using country-specific effects.      
 
4. Data and Estimation procedure 
 
  Since the early 1990s a good deal of empirical growth research using cross-
country data was inspired by new growth theories and the availability of better data. In 
our estimation strategy, we make use of cross-country and panel growth regressions as 
have been pioneered by Barro (1991) and used in a large literature since.  Our particular 
estimation strategy for the cross-section analysis follows Klasen (2002); in the panel 
analysis we will extend the analysis. As our focus is on long-run economic growth, the 
most basic specification will use purely cross-country data where the period 1960-2000 
will be treated as a single observation for each country.  In order to partly control for 
possible endogeneity issues and unobserved heterogeneity, we will also consider panel 
regressions that treat each decade as one observation and use initial values of the 
covariates. Those panel regressions will also allow us to properly study the impact of 
gender inequalities in labor force participation on economic growth. 
We include a number of regressors that were found to effect economic growth in 
the literature, including population growth, growth in the working age population, 
openness (exports plus imports as a share of GDP), the investment rate, human capital, 
and regional dummy variables to capture region-specific effects, which are invariably not 
captured in such cross-country regressions and can include common geographic, 
institutional, policy, trade, or conflict experiences within regions.
21 
In order to avoid some of the methodological problems of earlier studies on 
gender inequality and economic growth, we do not include in our equations male and 
female education level separately.  Instead, we generate four different education 
variables, one for the initial level of education in 1960, one for the gender gap in the level 
of education in the 1960, one for the growth in the level of education in the period 1960-
2000 and one for the growth rate of the female-male education level ratio for the period 
1960-2000. For the level of education, we could use the average education, the male or 
the female education level.  Each would make different assumptions about the 
possibilities to affect the gender gap.  Using the male educational level as a proxy for 
average education provides an upper-bound estimate of the effect of gender inequality in 
                                                 
21 We have also undertaken some further robustness checks using more variables used in standard growth 
regression analysis.  The results are available on request.  While the use of regional dummy variables is 
invariably a measure of our ignorance, in many cross-country regressions they turn out to be significant 
pointing to region-specific left-out variables that are hard to capture in standard cross-country regressions.       13
education on growth as it implicitly assumes that one could improve the gender gap in 
education by sending more girls to school without having to take out boys (as the male 
education levels is held constant this way).
22  In the alternative specification, when we 
use average education and the gender gap in average education in our equations we 
assume that any increase in female education means an equal sized reduction in male 
education and thus constitutes a lower-bound estimate of the effect of gender inequality 
on economic growth.          
It may well be the case that gender inequality in education has a direct impact on 
economic growth; but gender inequality may also affect economic growth through effects 
it has on investment rates, overall population growth, and growth in the working age 
population.  The interest is in capturing both the direct and indirect effects of gender 
inequality on economic growth. Following Klasen (2002) we will estimate a set of 
regressions to capture these two effects.  
The data used in this paper come from different data sources. Table 1 provides 
information on data sources and a description of the computation of the main variables of 
interest.   Using the variables defined in Table 1, the equations estimated (using OLS) in 
the cross-country analysis are the following
23: 
 
g= α +β1 INV+ β2POPGRO + β3LFG + β4ED60 + β5GED + β6RED60 + β7RGED + β8X + Є   
(1) 
 
INV= α+ β9POPGRO+ β10LFG + β11ED60 + β12 GED + β13RED60 + β14RGED + β15X + Є   (2) 
 
POPGRO= α +  β16 OPEN + β17ED60 + β18 GED+ β19RED60 + β20RGED+ β21 X + Є   (3) 
 
LFG= α  + β22OPEN + β23ED60 + β24GED + β25RED60 + β26 RGED + β27X + Є  (4) 
 
 g= α + β28 OPEN +β29 ED + β30GED + β31RED60 + β32RGED + β33X+ Є   (5) 
 
g=α +β34 INV+ β35POPGRO+ β36LFG +β37AED60 + β38GAED+ β39RED60+ β40RGED+ β41X+ 
Є  (6) 
 
g= α +β42 AED + β43GAED + β44RED60 + β45RGED + β46X+ Є   (7) 
 
The first equation measures the direct impact of education and the gender bias in 
education on economic growth, as it controls for investment, population and working age 
population growth. In all regressions we do control for regional variation
24.  Education 
and gender bias in education could, however, influence population growth, investment 
                                                 
22 Knowles et al. (2002) suggest that this is the most suitable specification for analyzing gender gaps in 
education.  This specification was also used in Klasen (2002). 
23 Note: equation 3 and 4 contain an additional explanatory variable with respect to Klasen (2002); 
openness. 
24 We use dummy variables for all regions, where the region left out is East Asia and Pacific.   14
and growth in the working age population in the future. Therefore there is a need to 
consider the indirect impact of education and gender inequalities on economic growth via 
these variables (equation 2-4). The total effect of gender inequality in education on 
growth is determined by the path analysis, in which we simply sum the direct effect and 
indirect effects of gender inequalities in education on growth (see Klasen, 2002).  
The fifth equation is the so called “reduced form” regression. In this equation, 
investment, overall population and working age population growth variables are omitted. 
We expect the coefficients on education of this regression to measure the total effect of 
gender bias in education directly. The results should then be comparable to the sum of 
direct and indirect effects calculated using the path analysis. 
Equations 6-7 consider the total number of years of schooling as a measure for the 
average human capital generating a lower bound estimate of these effects.    
The model is then re-estimated using panel data where dependent and explanatory 
variables refer to the following decades; 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-2000. Using 
panel data would allow us to control for endogeneity of the education and labor force 
participation variables by using initial values of each decade, and address unobserved 
heterogeneity and/or measurement error using country-specific effects.
 25  This way we 
feel we are able to generate more robust estimates, particularly regarding the labor force 
participation variables where endogeneity and measurement error are likely to be 
particularly problematic.    
We will use several variables to investigate the impact of gender inequalities in 
employment on growth across the world.  In a first specification we will add to our 
equation female share of the labor force. This specification holds the total labor force 
fixed and just adjusts the female share of labor force assuming that higher female 
employment could only come about through increased total employment.   While this 
might be the best specification, it does not allow for possible influences of male labor 
force participation on economic growth, which might bias the results.
26  We use a similar 
technique to that used in the cross-country growth regression model for the education 
variables with employment. We generate upper and lower bound estimates. We use male 
activity rates together with female-male ratio as upper bound estimates (the assumption is 
that the female-male ratio could be increased without reducing male activity rates, 
basically more jobs in total) and the total activity rate together with the female-male ratio 
                                                 
25 In the panel we use the total years of schooling of the population over 25. We do so because in the panel 
analysis we only have a ten-year window in which human capital (and gender differences) can have an 
effect and thus we want to focus our attention on the human capital of the labor force (rather than also 
including the 15-24 year old, only some of whom are in the labor force).   In robustness checks, we also 
include the years of education of adults 15 or older to particularly capture the effects of young educated 
women who make up a significant share of female employment in many developing countries.    
26 On the other hand, empirically male labor force participation rates do not differ much across space and 
over time so that the growth effects observed are probably due to increased female employment.     15
as lower bound (the assumption is that any additional female job would lead to fewer 
male jobs).  As with the education estimates, we believe that the true effects are closer to 
the former than the latter specification. It turns out that the best panel specification is to 
use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity
27.  
 
Compared to Klasen (2002), the country sample is smaller due firstly to changes in data 
availability from Penn World Tables, secondly to the elimination of apparently 
inconsistent data for education in two countries and thirdly to the lack of data for many 
transition countries before 1990
28.  
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistic of some variables of interest for the cross-country 
analysis. This includes a number of variables typically used in cross-country growth 
models. We already commented above on trends and regional differences in GDP growth, 
education, labor force, and non-income indicators of well-being by decade.  One point of 
note is the variable RGED which measures the female-male ratio of growth in education 
in the period 1960-2000.  This variable clearly reflects the different progress made in 
reducing the gender gap in education in a region.  While the ratio is far above 1 in East 
Asia and the Pacific, suggesting that females expanded their education faster than males, 
the reverse is the case especially in South Asia (0.77) but also in MENA region (0.87). 
The figures for SSA shows that female expanded their education about as fast as men. 
Table 2 also includes data on other regressors including the investment rate, population 
growth, and working age population growth.  Here well-known differences emerge. The 
region of East Asia and the Pacific is notable for its high investment rates, its high level 
of openness, its high growth in the working age population, and its moderate population 
growth.  The reverse is the case for Sub Saharan Africa: investment rates are low and 
population growth rates are high  The MENA region shows very high levels of 
population growth, but also sizable investment rates and levels of openness. While South 
                                                 
27 We have run the regressions for random effect but specification tests (Hausman tests) suggested that the 
fixed effect specification is superior.     
28 The previous version of the Penn Table (5.6) provided data for the following additional countries: 
Djibouti, Malta, Oman, Puerto Rico, Saudi, Somalia, Surinam, Iraq, Liberia, Myanmar, Reunion, Sudan, 
Swaziland, and Yugoslavia. For the last 9 countries Barro-Lee data on education were available. In addition 
to that the data for Eastern Europe countries were not limited to the 1990s. Penn 6.1 provides data for the 
entire sample set only for two Eastern Europe countries (Romania and Cyprus). Barro-Lee education data 
are suspicious for Austria and Bolivia, as they suggest stagnating or declining educational attainment 
despite substantial increases in enrolments.  Hence we dropped these two countries from our analysis. 
   16




Table 2: Descriptive statistic for Cross-Section Analysis (less than half page) 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 shows the basic set of cross-country regressions using the approach from 
Klasen (2002) as shown above, but with the new data that now stretch from 1960-2000.  
We start by considering the basic regression in column 1.  Before turning to the education 
variables, we briefly comment on the other regressors.  Compared to Klasen (2002), we 
observe a considerably better fit of the regression results, which might partially be due to 
the slightly smaller (and more homogeneous) sample.  Also, all the direct and reduced 
form regressions pass the omitted variable test.
30  The substantive results confirm many 
of the findings from the empirical growth literature.  First, we see a strong conditional 
convergence effect, there is a sizable positive impact of investment on economic growth, 
a large negative impact of population growth, while we also observe a large positive 
impact of growth of the working age population.  These findings confirm that the timing 
of the demographic transition can have a powerful impact on economic growth (David 
Bloom and Jeffrey Williamson 1998).  The size of the effect is considerably larger now 
than it was in Klasen (2002).  When population growth is falling due to lower fertility, 
but working age population growth is still high due to past high fertility, countries are 
receiving a ‘demographic gift’ of a low dependency burden (Bloom and Williamson 
1998) that allows higher savings, a higher ratio of workers to population, and higher 
investment demand.   Given that fertility in the MENA and South Asia region is falling 
rapidly, one would expect the region to enter this phase of the ‘demographic gift’ in 
coming decades.  To what extent they will be able to capitalize on this opportunity will 
depend largely on the ability to generate employment for the large numbers of young 
people entering the working age population and labour force in coming decades.  
Of the regional dummy variables, only those for Sub Saharan Africa and Latin 
America have a (marginally) significant negative coefficient.  The size of the coefficients 
are much smaller than in Klasen (2002), suggesting that the model is better able to 
explain the growth differences between regions than was possible in Klasen (2002).     
                                                 
29 It is quite difficult to adequately measure trade openness and the variable we use, export plus imports as a 
share of GDP, are not free from problems as these ratios are systematically lower in larger economies 
despite identical trade policies; other proxies have different problems.  For a discussion, see Jeffrey Frankel 
and David Roemer (1999) and Dani Rodrik and FranciscoRodriguez (2000) 
30 The population growth regression does not pass the Reset test, suggesting that omitted variables and/or 
non-linearities in these regressions might be a problem.  This does not affect out main (including the size of 
the direct, indirect and total effects) results and could only have a possible (and likely minor) influence on 
the relative importance of these two indirect effects.      17
Turning to the education variables, the initial male education and the growth of 
male education have the expected positive signs, although only the education growth 
variable is significant.  The initial female-male ratio of education has the expected 
positive sign but it is not significant (differently from Klasen, 2002 where it was 
marginally significant).  In contrast, the female-male ratio of growth in adult years of 
schooling is significant and larger in magnitude than found in Klasen (2002).  As these 
coefficients express the direct effect of gender inequality on economic growth, it appears 
that the direct effect of initial gender inequality on economic growth is relatively small 
while the impact of the gender inequality in the growth of education has a sizable direct 
impact on growth.
31   
Columns 2-4 estimate the indirect impact of gender inequality in education on 
economic growth through the effects they have on investment, population growth, and 
labour force growth.  The investment regression shows that the initial female male ratio 
of education has a significant positive effect on growth, while the impact of gender 
inequality in the growth of education is also positive but not significant.  In the 
population growth and working age population growth regressions, the impact of gender 
inequality in education is in the right direction, though not significant.
32   
Column 5 shows the reduced form regression, which omits the investment, 
population growth, and working age growth variables and thus gives a direct estimate of 
the total effect of gender inequality in education on economic growth.  The coefficients 
on both the initial ratio as well as the ratio of educational growth are considerably larger 
than in column 1 and now both are highly significant.  This suggests that gender 
inequality in education, both initial as well as gaps in educational growth, have a 
significant negative impact on growth.  A comparison between column 1 and 5 shows 
that the initial gender gap in education has mainly an indirect impact on economic growth 
(it appears from column 2 to be via investment) while the female-male ratio of 
educational growth has mainly a direct impact. 
                                                 
31 But here, endogeneity might be a problem which will be partially addressed in the panel regressions.   
32 While there is a large and conclusive literature that shows that female education reduces fertility (e.g. see 
Schultz 1997; Klasen, 1999; and World Bank 2001 for a survey), the link between female education and 
population growth rates is less strong as population growth is also affected by the age structure of the 
population.  In a population with a large share of women in child-bearing age, even a low total fertility rate 
for each of them can generate considerable population growth compared to a population where the share of 
women is lower.  Therefore it is not surprising that the link here is weaker than if one used the total fertility 
rate as the dependent variable.   When we include labor force growth in the population equation to proxy 
for the effect of the age structure, the effects of the initial female-male ratio of schooling and the ratio of 
the growth become significant, as expected.       18
Regressions 6 and 7 use average education and thus estimate a lower bound effect 
of the impact of gender inequality on economic growth.  The effects are generally 
predictably smaller and somewhat less significant.   
 
Table 3: Gender Inequality in Education and Economic Growth  (one page) 
  
In Table 4 we calculate to what extent gender bias in education can explain 
growth differences between the various regions of the world.  We do this for the upper 
and lower bound estimates.  Fortunately, the difference between these two estimates is 
fairly small.  
 
Table 4: Gender inequality and growth differences between Regions (half a page or 
little more) 
 
We also note that the sum of direct and indirect effect (regression 1-4) gives very 
similar results as the direct estimate from the reduced form (regression 5). As expected, 
the regions with the largest gender gaps in education, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa and 
MENA suffer the largest losses in terms of economic growth.  But there are big 
differences here.  In contrast to Klasen (2002) where both South Asia and the MENA 
region were suffering similar losses of about 0.9 percentage points in annual per capita 
growth per year, the losses are now slightly larger for South Asia, around 1 percentage 
point, and very much smaller for the MENA region, at about 0.7 percentage points per 
year.  The difference for the diverging performance lies in the faster expansion of female 
schooling in the MENA region which has contributed to closing the gender gap in 
education, while progress in South Asia was much more modest.  
When examining the pathways through which gender inequality in MENA, South 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa leads to lower growth, there is a sizable direct effect which 
amounts to about 60% of the total difference.  This direct effect refers mainly to the 
lowering of the quality of human capital as a result of gender inequalities in education.  
But this is actually somewhat smaller than found in Klasen (2002) where for MENA 
about 75% of the total effect was accounted for by the direct effect.  The indirect effect 
via investment has become somewhat smaller while via demographic more important. 
Clearly all pathways investigated contribute to the resulting growth difference, and the 
magnitudes have shifted toward a greater importance of the demographic pathway which 
suggests that higher female education lowers population growth which in turn helps 
improve economic growth.      
 
Table 5 shows the result of panel regressions using fixed effects, which was found 
to be the preferred specification based on the Hausman test.  Also here, the empirical 
findings in those regressions are consistent with the empirical and theoretical literature: 
we find conditional convergence, a positive effect on growth of the working age 
population, and a negative effect of population growth, though both are significant in   19
only some specifications.
33  Investment rates significantly promote growth and openness 
has a small positive, but rarely significant impact.    
The specification in regression 8 only examines the impact of gender gaps in 
education on economic growth.  In contrast to the panel results in Klasen (2002) and the 
cross-section results shown here, the positive effect of a high female-male years of 
schooling ratio among the adult population (the female-male ratio of education of adults 
25 or older) is relatively small and not statistically significant.  Further investigations 
show that this is not driven by a slightly different composition of sample, but by the 
addition of the 1990s.  If the 1990s are dropped, a higher females-male ratio of years of 
schooling has a large and significant effect (not shown here).  In fact, it is due to the two 
regions Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa in the 1990s.  If we exclude these regions 
for that time period, regression 9 shows that then the positive effect of higher gender 
equality in education is again sizable and significant.
34  It appears that the moderate to 
poor growth performance in these two regions despite falling gender gaps in education is 
important enough to reduce the overall effect of educational gender gaps to 
insignificance.  It seems plausible to assume that the poor growth performance 
particularly of Sub Saharan Africa was not related to the reduced gender gaps in 
education, but many other factors that have been analyzed in the literature (e.g. Paul 
Collier and Jan Willem Gunning 1999; World Bank 2006).  Conversely, regression 9 
suggests that in all other regions, the impact of gender gaps in education on growth 
remains as strong in the 1990s as before (in fact, slightly stronger).     
In regression 10, we replace the education variable with the education of adults 15 
or older.  This is to also capture the effects of high employment rates of educated women 
in the young age groups of 15-24 which might have a particularly large impact on 
growth.  It turns out that in this specification the effect of gender gaps in education on 
growth are only significant if we limit the analysis to OECD, East Asian, and South 
Asian countries.  But there the effect is very large and highly significant.  This appears 
plausible as these are the regions where young educated women have been particularly 
active in the labor market.    
In regressions 11 to 16, we consider the full sample again and include various 
labor force participation variables.
35  We consider two different explanatory variables for 
the labor force participation: the female share of the total labor force (FLFT) and the ratio 
of female to male economic activity rates (RACT=FACT/MACT).  In regression 11 the 
female share of the labor force (FLFT) has a positive, large significant coefficient on 
                                                 
33 This may be related to the fact that the impact of population growth and working age population growth 
materializes with some delay and may therefore not be well-captured in the 10 year periods considered.   
34 It is even larger if we consider the reduced form estimate, i.e. if we leave out the investment rate, labor 
force growth, and population growth.  In both cases, they are larger than identical panel regressions in 
Klasen (2002). 
35 We also analysed the sample where we dropped Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1990s and 
report on the results where appropriate.      20
economic growth, i.e. countries where the (initial) female share increased from decade to 
decade were able to achieve higher rates of subsequent economic growth.  The effect of 
gender-gaps in education (ORED 25+) in this specification is considerable but not 
significant.  If we exclude Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1990s, the effect 
becomes much larger and highly significant.
36  In regression 12, we use the other 
education variable (YRED 15+) which shows a large impact of education gaps on 
growth, and a smaller and no longer significant impact of female shares of the labor 
force, again reduced to OECD, East Asia, and South Asia.    
In regression 13 we use the male labor force participation rate (Male activity rate: 
MACT) and the ratio of the female to male labor force participation rates (Ratio of 
activity rates: RACT) as an alternative way to capture the gender gap in employment. 
This female-male ratio is highly significant and positive, while the male economic active 
rate has a non-significant negative sign.  If we add the education gap in regression 14 the 
coefficient on the gender gap in labor force participation is still positive and significant 
but smaller, while the coefficient on the male activity rate is now positive but still 
insignificant.  The coefficient on educational gaps is not significant.  In the reduced 
sample (excluding Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America for the 1990s), it becomes 
significant also in this specification while the impact of activity rates becomes slightly 
smaller but remains significant (see regression 15).  Lastly, we limit our sample to OECD 
countries, East Asia, and South Asia and use the alternative education variable and find 
that then education gaps have a very large impact on growth while gaps in activity rates 
have a smaller (and only marginally significant) impact on growth.     
Since the coefficient on the male activity rate is small and insignificant, altering 
the male activity rate when one increases the female activity rate would not have a 
significant impact on growth.  Thus, in contrast to the education regressions in Table 3, it 
is not necessary to calculate an upper and lower bound regression as the male activity rate 
seems to be immaterial for growth.
37   
On the whole, these results suggest that gender gaps in labor force participation 
have a negative impact on economic growth; since these gaps proxy for gaps in 
employment (see discussion above), gender gaps in employment similarly negatively 
affect economic growth.  For the MENA and South Asia region, where female 
employment is still very low, this could have a significant impact on economic growth.  
The results also give some interesting insights into the relative importance of education 
and employment gaps in different time periods.  In the full sample of countries, 
educational gender gaps are not so important, while employment gaps have a particularly 
large impact on economic performance.  This is largely due to the experience of the 
1990s where gender gaps in employment appear to be more consequential than those in 
education.  Once Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in the 1990s are excluded, 
however, education and employment gaps have a similar impact on economic growth.  If 
we change to an education variable that particularly includes young people, the results 
                                                 
36 The regression is not shown but available on request.  
37 This is confirmed by regressions (not shown here) where we replaced the male activity rate with the total 
activity rate and now find that the impact of the gender gap is larger while the impact of the total activity 
rate is now negative.  These regressions are available on request.         21
suggest indeed that education gaps are more important than employment gaps, at least in 
the OECD, East Asia, and South Asia.  This suggests that previous studies that only 
examined gender gaps in education were partly implicitly capturing the effects of gender 
gaps in employment and it is indeed useful to consider the two jointly as we have done 
here.  It also suggests, however, that it is not easy to clearly answer the question as to the 
relative important of the two which appears to be quite sensitive to the sample, time 
period, and education variable used.  This will become more apparent below. 
In further analyses, we also considered some interaction terms.  Of particular 
interest is to interact the effect of openness with gender gaps in labor force participation 
to see whether the effects of gender gaps in labor force participation rates are different in 
countries that are more exposed to international trade.  The results (not shown here) show 
a positive (but not significant) interaction term while coefficient on RACT is now smaller 
and still highly significant in all specifications.  This provides some supporting evidence 
that in countries that are strongly exposed to international trade, lower gender gaps in 
labor force participation are particularly beneficial to economic growth, in line with some 
of the arguments made above.   
Table 5: Gender inequality and Economic growth (one page) 
Once again, we simulate the impact of gender inequality in education and 
employment (using gender gaps in labor force participation as our proxy) based on these 
panel regressions.  In Table 6 we show to what extent the difference in economic growth 
between East Asia and the Pacific and the MENA can be accounted for by differences in 
gender inequality in education and employment.  Estimates based on regression 9 already 
show that gender gaps in education can account for a sizable portion of growth 
differences, but this difference in declining, due to a shrinking difference in gender gaps 
in education between the two regions.  Once gender gaps in employment are included, the 
share of growth differences explained by these combined gaps increases significantly; in 
fact, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s, the gaps can account for all of the growth differences 
or even more than that in some specifications suggesting that the MENA region would 
have grown faster than East Asia in the absence of the gaps.  The growth costs, compared 
to East Asia, of gender gaps in employment, are increasing over time as the gender gaps 
in employment are shrinking much faster in East Asia than in MENA.   In most 
specifications, the gender gaps in employment explain a larger share of the growth 
differences with East Asia, suggesting that MENA is particularly held back by its low 
female labor force participation rates, a subject much discussed in the literature (e.g. 
World Bank 2004).   
 
Table 6: Gender Inequality in Education and Employment and Growth impact 
(EAP-MENA) (less than half page, probably a quarter) 
 
Table 7 shows to what extent the growth differences between South Asia and East 
Asia can be explained by gender gaps in education and employment.  Here the impact of 
larger educational gender gaps in South Asia plays a particularly large role.  Depending 
on the specification, it can account for a growth difference between 0.2 and 1.4 
percentage points.  In contrast, the impact of employment effects is generally smaller, but 
is increasing over time.  In fact, the ILO data we use showed smaller gender gaps in labor 
force participation in South Asia than in East Asia in the 1960s and 1970s; if these level   22
difference are to be believed, then South Asia’s main problem has been, apart from their 
stubbornly high gender gaps in education, that female participation and employment has 
expanded much slower than in East Asia and this is exacting a rising growth costs, 
compared to East Asia.  This is also consistent with country studies showing that East 
Asian economies such as China, Vietnam, and Indonesia have benefited particularly from 
integrating women into the labor market; in South Asia, only Bangladesh has followed 
such a route and appears to have profited from it.
38 
While these calculations nicely show the particular constraints in different 
regions, they cannot give clear answers to the question whether gender gaps in education 
or employment lead to higher growth costs.  This depends to a significant degree on the 
education variable, the time period, and the sample.  But we can say with more certainty 
that in relative terms, MENA’s problem are more on the employment front, while in 
South Asia they are more on the education front (though rising on the employment front).   
 
Table 7: Gender Inequality in Education and Employment and Growth impact 
(EAP-SA) (less than half page, probably a quarter) 
 
6. Conclusions and Caveats 
 
  The challenge of increasing the economic growth of a country is, as suggested 
here, to a considerable extent linked to the role played by women in the society. The costs 
of discrimination toward women in education and employment not only harm the women 
concerned, but impose a cost for the entire society.   
            In South Asia women are still in the twenty first century very much discriminated 
against in both education level and economic participation. In Middle East and North 
Africa the gender gap in education has been reduced from high levels, but gender gaps in 
employment remain pervasive. In contrast to some Asian countries, where export-
oriented industries have led to a reduction of the gender gap in the labour market in the 
last decades, increased female education in MENA has not translated into higher labour 
market participation. Women in this region are encountering structural barriers
39 in 
employment but those barriers may also be social, cultural, and ideological (World Bank 
2004).  
Regarding the growth costs of gender inequality, we find the following:  
  Firstly, gender inequality in education reduces economic growth also in the 1990s.  
The findings from earlier studies that used data up until 1990 are largely confirmed 
through this expanded analysis although the impact of gender gaps in education in the 
1990s in the panel specification is sensitive to the inclusion of specific regions in the 
1990s.   
  Secondly, gender inequality in education in the Middle East and North Africa and 
South Asia region continues to harm growth in that region, but by decreasing amounts.  
This is due to the fact that gender gaps in education have been sharply reduced there over 
                                                 
38 See Klasen (2006) for further discussions on these country studies.   
39 Structural barriers related to the economic reconstruction, recession and limited domestic and foreign 
investment.   23
the past two decades, with much faster progress in MENA than in South Asia.  As a 
result, we expect gender inequality in education to play a decreasing role in harming 
growth prospects in MENA and South Asia.  While this is true in an absolute sense, it is 
not always true in a relative sense.  As East Asia has closed its gender gaps in education 
much faster than South Asia, the growth differences accounted for by differences in 
gender gaps between the two regions mounted in past decades.   
  Thirdly, the panel analysis suggests that gender inequality in labor force 
participation (as a proxy for gender gaps in employment) has a sizable negative impact on 
economic growth.  Simulations suggest that MENA’s and South Asia growth prospects, 
when compared to other regions, are significantly reduced through this effect as the 
impact of gender inequality in employment is large and has been falling much slower 
than in other regions.   
Thus a significant constraint to higher economic growth in those regions appears 
to be the substantial gender inequality persisting in education and employment.  While 
these results are suggestive, we want to emphasize that the assessment of the impact of 
employment gaps is based on data for labor force participation rates that are measured 
with error and are often not fully comparable internationally.  It is highly lamentable that 
comparable labor force participation and employment data are not available for most 
developing countries.  This is despite the fact that increasing numbers of household and 
labor force surveys are undertaken in these countries, but the results are not used to 
generate consistent and comparable data on employment, labor force participation and 
pay.
40  This remains a major challenge for the ILO and other international organizations 
charged with providing such data.   
Also, the usual caveats of cross-country regressions apply, including omitted 
variable bias, model uncertainty, endogeneity, among others.  We have tried to control 
for some of these issues, but more work will be needed to solidify the findings.  In 
particular, we were only partly able to control for endogeneity in the panel regressions 
and further work on identifying suitable instruments is clearly an important area for 
further research.  Lastly, we need to acknowledge that our results concern the impact of 
gender gaps in education and employment on measured national output.  To the extent 
that higher female labor force participation comes at the expense of reduced household 
labor, the economic and well-being losses of such a reduction is not included in our 
assessment.
41  The extent to which this might be a problem is clearly an area of further 
research. 
                                                 
40 This is particularly lamentable as these household surveys have been used by the World Bank to generate 
roughly consistent and comparable and publicly available poverty statitics for developing countries.  It is a 
shame that ILO does not have the capacity, funding, or political will to use these same data to generate 
internationally comparable employment data.      
41 To the extent such increased labor force participation would come in addition to non-market work, the 
double burden this implies for the women concerned is also not considered here, but clearly is an issue that 
is under investigation in the literature.     24
If our results are confirmed by further studies, this points to an urgent need of 
increasing female education level and their participation in the labour force.  While our 
results suggests that changing the composition of the labour force to include more 
females (and thus fewer males) would have a positive effect on growth, a more realistic 
policy recommendation would be to develop an employment-intensive growth strategy 
that makes particular use of females.  At the least, the results suggest that current barriers 
to female employment are not only disadvantageous to females, but also appear to reduce 
economic growth in developing countries, and particularly in MENA and South Asia  
  One should also bear in mind the findings from a large literature suggesting that 
gender inequality in education and employment also have a significant negative impact 
on other development goals such as reductions in fertility, child mortality, and 
undernutrition.  Thus reducing existing gender inequality in education and employment 
will not only promote growth, but also further these other valuable development goals.
42 
  
                                                 
42 Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2004) and King et al (2008) to estimate the magnitude of these effects.   25
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Table 1: Variables names, definition and data source 
 
Variable 
name Definition  Data source 
G 
Per capita annual compound growth rate in Purchasing 
power parity-adjusted GDP per capita  Penn World Table (6.1) 
GDP60(00)  Real GDP per capita in PPP-terms in 1960 (2000)  Penn World Table (6.1) 
INV  Average investment rates  Penn World Table (6.1) 
POPGRO  Growth rate of total population  Penn World Table (6.1) 
OPEN  Average of exports plus imports as a share of GDP 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI, 2002) 
LFG  Growth rate of working age population (15-64)  WDI, 2002 
FERT60(00)  Level of fertility 1960 (2000)  WDI, 2003 
M560(00)  Under five mortality rate 1960 (2000)  WDI, 2004 
Life   Life expectancy measured in years  WDI, 2005 
ED 
Number of year of schooling for the male population(15+ 
and 25+)  Barro and Lee (2000) 
AED  Number of year of schooling for the population  Barro and Lee (2000) 
GED  Absolute (annual) growth in male years of schooling  Barro and Lee (2000) 
GEDF  Absolute (annual) growth in female years of schooling    
GAED  Absolute growth in total years of schooling  Barro and Lee (2000) 
RED  Female-Male ratio of schooling  Barro and Lee (2000) 
RGED  Female-male ratio of the growth in the years of schooling  Barro and Lee (2000) 
MACT  Male economic activity rate (15-64)  ILO Laborsta (2003) 
FACT   Female economic activity rate (15-64)  ILO Laborsta (2003) 
RACT  Female-Male Ratio of Activity Rates (15-64)  ILO Laborsta (2003) 
TACT  Total economic activity rate (15-64)  ILO Laborsta (2003) 
FLFT  Female share of the total labor force (15-64)  ILO Laborsta (2003) 
   32
Table 2: Descriptive statistic for Cross-Section Analysis 
 
   TOTAL MENA  LAC  EAP  OECD  SA  SSA  ECA 
G  1.78 2.24 1.53 4.05 2.66 2.09 0.57 3.48 
INV  15.48 13.18 13.96 20.53 23.92 11.21 10.45 17.31 
OPEN  72.98 71.41 79.37 87.82 57.26  38.6  74.76 81.91 
M560  166.65  233.75 135.5 139.56 37.45  228  273.08 80.78 
M500  64.35  45.13 32 31.77  6.62  80.65  147.42  16.38 
POPGRO  1.89 2.75 1.79 2.01 0.73  2.2  2.5  0.91 
FERT60  5.31 7.12 6.12 5.69 2.88  6.3  6.49 3.24 
FERT00  3.15 3.32  2.7  2.27 1.67 3.45 5.09 1.47 
GDP60  3377 1971 3299 1813 8473  930  1478 2233 
GDP00  8693  4462  6897 12033  23153 2186  2375  7910 
LFG  2.02 2.95 2.35 2.69 0.86 2.33 2.46  1 
RED60  0.7  0.39 0.91 0.59 0.93 0.29 0.47 0.73 
RGED  1.03 0.87 1.09 1.24 1.02 0.77 0.97 1.05 
EDF60  3.41 0.65 3.26 2.74 6.56 0.89 1.19 5.24 
GEDF  0.07 0.11 0.07  0.1  0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09 
Source: WDI 2002,Penn World Table 6.1, Barro & Lee (2000). 
Note: In addition to the dependent and explanatory variables of our cross-country model we do report child 
mortality (under 5 years of life) in 1960 (M560) and in 2000 (M500), the fertility rate (FERT) and the gross 
domestic product per capita (GDP) in 1960 and in 2000 for each region. 
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LOGGDP60  -2.27*** -3.51  -0.18  -0.21 -2.47***  -2.29***  -2.52*** 
  0.50  3.1  0.34  0.36 0.63 0.52 0.65 
POPGRO  -2.80***  0.91       -2.79***  
  0.53 2.25        0.53   
LFG  2.33*** 0.04        2.32***   
  0.47 2.10        0.47   
OPEN  -0.001 0.041**  -0.003  -0.002  0.005* -0.0005 0.006* 
  0.003  0.02  0.002  0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 
INV  0.06***        0.06***  
  0.02        0.02  
RED60  0.68 5.84**  -0.4  -0.17  1.75** 0.76 1.72** 
  0.85 3.08  0.32  0.33 0.89 0.89 0.91 
ED60  0.01 0.92** -0.02  0.01 0.16**  0  0.13* 
  0.07 0.44  0.05  0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 
GED  10.42*** 35.42  -1.01  0.85  17.33***  10.59***  18.31*** 
  4.35  28.95 1.94  2.14 4.46 4.78 4.86 
RGED  0.70*** 2.07  0.001  0.05 0.95***  0.47**  0.62** 
  0.29 2.19  0.25  0.25 0.37 0.25 0.34 
SA  -0.07 -3.58  -0.17  -0.46**  -0.90*  -0.02  -0.85* 
  0.59 3.07  0.24  0.24 0.64 0.61 0.65 
SSA  -0.83* -6.92***  0.40**  -0.06  -2.49*** -0.81* -2.47*** 
  0.57 2.76  0.22  0.22 0.70 0.58 0.71 
ECA  -0.1  3.57  -0.91**  -1.32***  -0.46 -0.1 -0.46 
  0.63  2.80  0.41     0.54  0.87  0.63  0.88 
LAC  -0.87* -4.87**  0.08  -0.17 -1.79***  -0.87*  -1.81*** 
  0.56 2.73  0.28  0.27 0.74 0.56 0.74 
MENA  -0.17  -3.77  0.72**  0.48 -1.26** -0.12 -1.24** 
  0.53  3.77  0.42      0.41  0.66  0.52  0.65 
OECD  0.47 4.81*  -1.07***  -1.64***  -0.12 0.55  0.01 
  0.60 3.04  0.37  0.38 0.83 0.60 0.82 
CONSTANT  7.35*** 13.65  3.26***  3.39***  7.16***  7.65***  7.73*** 
  1.84  11.80 1.06  1.11 2.10 1.85 2.14 
ADJ R2  0.76 0.66  0.64  0.62 0.63 0.76 0.64 
OV Test  passed passed  Failed  passed passed passed Passed 
OBS  93 93  93  93 93 93 93 
Source: Authors computation 
Heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard-errors reported under the coefficients.  *** Refers to 99%; ** to 95%; 
and * to 90% significance level using a one-tail test. 
+: regression with total education instead of male education only.  OV test refers to the Ramsey Reset test 
for omitted variables.   
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Total annual growth 
difference  3.48 1.96 1.74 3.48 1.96 1.74 
  Upper bound estimate  Lower bound estimate 
Accounted  for  by:        
Direct effect of 
gender inequality in 
education (1)  0.26
43  0.52 0.38 0.22 0.45 0.33 
Of which:  
Initial  ratio  (RED60)  0.08 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.15 
Ratio of educational 
growth (RGED)  0.18 0.31 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.17 
Indirect effects: 
via  investment  0.08 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.07 
via population growth 
(3)  0.14 0.33 0.22 0.10 0.26 0.17 
via labor force growth 
(4)  -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
Total Indirect Effect  0.22 0.34 0.30 0.16 0.36 0.22 
Of which: 
Initial  ratio  (RED60)  0.13 0.32 0.22 0.12 0.29 0.14 
Ratio of educational 
growth (RGED)  0.07 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.04 
Total Direct and 
Indirect effect  0.46 0.95 0.69 0.38 0.81 0.55 
Total effect using 
Reduced form (5)  0.47 0.97 0.70 0.38 0.81 0.41 
Of  which:  RED60 0.22 0.52 0.36 0.21 0.52 0.24 
Of  which:  RGED  0.25 0.45 0.35 0.17 0.29 0.16 
Source: Authors computation 
 
                                                 
43 Sums do not add up precisely due  rounding.   35  36
Table 5: Gender inequality and Economic growth 
   (8)  (9)  ( 10)  ( 11)  ( 12)  (13)  ( 14)  ( 15)  (16) 
LOGGDP  -5.54***  -7.82*** -10.37*** -6.08*** -10.81*** -6.99***  -6.14***  -8.48***  -11.09*** 
  1.42 1.33  1.31  1.43  1.32 1.28 1.48 1.41  1.28 
POPGRO  -0.57* -0.44  -0.22  -0.47  -0.23  -0.47*
  -0.59* -0.45  -0.20 
  0.42 0.35  0.40  0.40  0.39 0.37 0.42 0.37  0.39 
LFG  0.31 0.46*  0.32  0.38  0.34 0.48*  0.45*  0.54** 0.29 
  0.27 0.31  0.40  0.31  0.40 0.30 0.31 0.31  0.37 
FLFT       7.86**  4.17         
       3.49  3.36         
OPEN  0.002 0.005  0.006  0.000  0.006 0.001 0.001 0.003  0.007 
  0.004 0.005  0.008  0.005  0.007 0.005 0.004 0.005  0.007 
INV  0.09*** 0.10***  0.13***  0.10***  0.14*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.10***  0.14*** 
  0.03 0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.02 
OED25+  0.00 0.08  0.00     0.00  0.05  
  0.16 0.17  0.16     0.16  0.16  
ORED25+  0.43 2.30**   1.01     1.14  3.09**  
  1.45 1.28  1.43     1.51  1.41  
YED15+      0.31**   0.31***       0.29*** 
      0.13  0.12       0.12 
YRED15+      3.33**  3.66**       4.42*** 
      1.65  1.70       1.76 
RACT           5.41*** 3.72**  2.97**  1.93* 
           1.48 1.51 1.37  1.49 
MACT           -0.70 3.85 -0.91 -6.60 
           6.69 6.90 7.03  5.73 
1960S  0.12 -0.65  -1.32***  0.59  -0.97*  0.61 0.40 -0.21 -0.49 
  0.57 0.59  0.51  0.61  0.59 0.58 0.70 0.76  0.74 
1970S  0.04 -0.52  -1.04***  0.37  -0.80**  0.30 0.28 -0.18 -0.47 
  0.38 0.41  0.38  0.41  0.44 0.37 0.46 0.51  0.54 
1980S  -0.60 **  -1.07***  -0.62***  -0.44*  -0.52** -0.31  -0.46 -0.86*** -0.33 
  0.26 0.29  0.25  0.27  0.26 0.26 0.29 0.33  0.30 
Constant  20.20*** 26.79*** 34.93*** 18.53*** 34.58*** 21.45***  16.04**  27.53***  40.98*** 
  4.87 4.78  4.73  4.89  4.55 7.80 8.03 7.51  6.32 
R2  0.32 0.43  0.60  0.34  0.61 0.36 0.34 0.44  0.62 
OBS  341 296  143  341  307  441  341  296  143 
Note: Heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors reported under the coefficient. *** Refers to 99%; ** to 95%; 
and * to 90% significance level using a one-tail test.  In regressions 9 and 15, the sample excludes Sub Saharan 
Africa and Latin America for the 1990s.  In regressions 10, 12, and 16, only OECD, East Asian and South Asian 
countries are included.   
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Table 6: Gender Inequality in Education and Employment and Growth impact (EAP-
MENA) 
  
   1960s 1970s 1980s  1990s 
Growth difference EAP-MENA by decades  0.53  1.48  2.71  1.55 
Regression 9             
Education effect (ORED)  0.41  0.65  0.61  0.54 
Regression 11         
Education effect (ORED)  0.18  0.29  0.27  0.24 
Employment effect (FLFT)  0.75  0.86  0.96  1.06 
Total Effect  0.93  1.15  1.23  1.30 
Regression 13         
Employment effect (RACT)  1.15  1.36  1.62  1.73 
Regression 14       
Education effect (ORED)  0.20  0.32  0.30  0.27 
Employment effect (RACT)  0.79  0.94  1.11  1.19 
Total Effect  0.99  1.26  1.41  1.45 
Regression 15             
Education effect (ORED)  0.55  0.88  0.82  0.72 
Employment effect (RACT)  0.63  0.75  0.89  0.95 
Total effect  1.18  1.62  1.71  1.67 
Source: Authors’ computation based on Table 5.  Since regressions 10, 12, and 16 did not 
include data from the MENA region, they are not included in the simulations.   
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Table 7: Gender Inequality in Education and Employment and Growth impact (EAP-
SA) 
 
   1960s 1970s  1980s  1990s 
Growth difference EAP-SA by decades  2.26  3.86  0.19  0.79 
Regression 9        
Education effect (ORED)  0.57  0.50  0.67  0.73 
Regression 10         
Education effect (YRED)  0.69  0.88  0.95  0.78 
Regression 11         
Education effect (ORED)  0.25  0.22  0.29  0.32 
Employment effect (FLFT)  -0.17 0.09  0.34  0.45 
Total Effect  0.08  0.31  0.63  0.77 
Regression 12         
Education effect (YRED)  1.08  1.11  1.19  1.00 
Employment effect (FLFT)  -0.09 0.05  0.18  0.24 
Total Effect  0.98  1.15  1.37  1.24 
Regression 13         
Employment effect (RACT)  -0.37 -0.02  0.43  0.60 
Regression 14         
Education effect (ORED)  0.28  0.25  0.33  0.36 
Employment effect (RACT)  -0.26 -0.01  0.29  0.42 
Total effect  0.03  0.24  0.63  0.78 
Regression 15             
Education effect (ORED)  0.77  0.67  0.90  0.99 
Employment effect (RACT)  -0.20 -0.01  0.24  0.33 
Total effect  0.56  0.66  1.14  1.32 
Regression 16        
Education effect (YRED)  1.30  1.34  1.44  1.21 
Employment effect (RACT)  -0.13 -0.01  0.15  0.22 
Total effect  1.17  1.33  1.59  1.43 
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Appendix:  
 
List of Countries for our analysis by region: 
Middle East and 
North Africa  Sub-Saharan Africa  OECD 




Algeria  Angola  Australia  Antigua and Barbuda  Albania 
Egypt Benin  Austria  Argentina  Armenia 
Iran Botswana  Belgium  Barbados  Belarus 
Jordan Burkina  Faso  Canada  Belize  Bulgaria 
Lebanon Burundi 
Czech 
Republic  Bolivia Cyprus 
Morocco Cameroon  Denmark  Brazil  Estonia 
Syria Cape  Verde  Finland  Chile  Latvia 
Tunisia  Central African Republic  France  Colombia  Macedonia+ 
Yemen Chad  Germany  Costa  Rica  Poland 
 Comoros  Greece  Cuba  Romania 
East Asia and 
Pacific  Congo, Dem.Rep.  Hungary  Dominica 
Russian Federation 
+ 
  Congo, Republic  Iceland  Dominican Republic  Slovak Republic 
China Cote  d'Ivoire  Ireland  Ecuador Slovenia 
Fiji  Equatorial Guinea  Israel  El Salvador  Turkey 
Hong Kong  Ethiopia  Italy  Grenada  Ukraine 
Indonesia Gabon  Japan  Guatemala   
Korea Gambia,  The  Luxembourg  Guyana  
Macao, China  Ghana  Netherlands  Haiti   
Malaysia Guinea  New  Zealand  Honduras   
Papua New Guinea  Guinea-Bissau  Norway  Jamaica   
Philippines Kenya  Portugal  Mexico   
Singapore Lesotho  Spain Nicaragua   
Taiwan Madagascar Sweden  Panama   
Thailand Malawi  Switzerland  Paraguay   
 Mali 
United 
Kingdom Peru   
South Asia  Mauritania  United States  St. Kitts and Nevis   
  Mauritius  St.  Lucia   
Bangladesh  Mozambique    St.Vincent & Gren.   
India  Namibia    Trinidad and Tobago   
Nepal Niger    Uruguay   
Pakistan Nigeria    Venezuela,  RB   
Sri Lanka  Rwanda       
  Sao Tome and Principe       
 Senegal       
 Seychelles       
 Sierra  Leone       
 South  Africa       
 Tanzania       
 Togo       
 Uganda       
 Zambia       
 Zimbabwe       
+ Data were not available for the entire period of analysis 
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Table A1: Annual per capita income and other non-economic Indicators by Region, 1960-1990 
 
EAP  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Under five mortality  138.50  89.63 56.43 42.00 31.59 
Total fertility  5.62 4.65 3.39 2.83 2.31 
Life expectancy  52.57 59.87 64.94 68.76 71.55 
Income per capita  1813 2963 5117 8930  11755 
SA                
Under five mortality  228.00 192.00 154.60 109.40  80.64 
Total fertility  6.30 6.02 5.54 4.31 3.45 
Life expectancy  45.32 50.02 54.70 59.36 63.80 
Income per capita  930  1099 1187 1660 2186 
SSA                
Under five mortality  273.89 233.86 182.47 148.96 146.15 
Total fertility  6.49 6.53 6.49 5.98 5.13 
Life expectancy  40.40 44.30 48.08 51.18 49.06 
Income per capita  1488 1868 2087 2182 2400 
MENA                
Under five mortality  233.75 188.13 137.57  68.88  45.14 
Total fertility  7.12 6.78 6.13 4.68 3.32 
Life expectancy  47.89 53.08 58.55 64.86 68.37 
Income per capita  1968 2762 3660 3499 4462 
ECA                
Under five mortality  80.78 55.11 43.20 25.05 16.40 
Total fertility  3.24 2.78 2.40 2.14 1.47 
Life expectancy  66.15 68.77 69.59 70.79 71.59 
Income per capita  2233 3650 5300 9323 7346 
LAC                
Under five mortality  135.58  109.00  70.91 42.65 30.85 
Total fertility  6.13 5.37 4.10 3.29 2.69 
Life expectancy  57.25 61.64 65.72 69.14 71.56 
Income per capita  3362 4270 5072 5471 7086 
OECD                
Under five mortality  37.67 26.05 15.14  9.73  6.61 
Total fertility  2.87 2.46 1.93 1.79 1.65 
Life expectancy  70.19 71.72 73.80 75.76 77.73 
Income per capita  8386  12024 15420 18875 23173 
Source: Penn World Table 6.1 and WDI 2002.  Please note that the data for ECA refer to only two observations 
before the 1990s (Cyprus and Romania).  All are unweighted averages and might in some cases be affected by 
compositional changes.   
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Table A2: Education Indicators by Region, 1960-1999 
 
East Asia and Pacific  1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+) 2.11 2.71 3.75 5.22  6.55 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  4.11 4.74 5.59 6.81  7.8 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 3.13 3.73 4.68 6.02  7.18 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+)  0.5 0.56 0.65 0.75 0.83 
female education 15+ (FED)  2.74 3.53 4.46 5.46  6.7 
male education 15+ (ED)  4.6 5.21 5.9 6.77  7.85 
total education 15+ (TED)  3.68 4.38 5.19 6.12  7.28 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED) 0.59 0.67 0.7 0.76  0.84 
South Asia 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+)  0.7 1.24 1.51 1.9  2.55 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  1.77 2.37 3.2 3.83  4.49 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 1.27 1.72 2.39 2.89  3.54 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+)  0.25 0.34 0.36 0.43 0.51 
female education 15+ (FED)  0.89 1.3 1.86 2.68  3.23 
male education 15+ (ED)  1.9 2.48 3.58 4.5  5.05 
total education 15+ (TED)  1.42 1.91 2.75 3.62  4.16 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED)  0.29 0.37 0.43 0.54 0.6 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+) 0.92 0.97 1.37 1.92  2.63 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  1.67 1.80 2.54 3.21  3.92 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 1.28 1.37 1.93 2.54  3.25 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+)  0.43 0.45 0.47 0.55 0.62 
female education 15+ (FED)  1.23 1.39 1.73 2.34  2.87 
male education 15+ (ED)  2.05 2.32 2.76 3.52  3.92 
total education 15+ (TED)  1.63 1.84 2.23 2.92  3.38 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED) 0.48 0.52 0.60 0.62  0.70 
Middle East and North Africa  1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+) 0.44 0.60 1.25 2.57  4.18 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  1.36 2.10 3.23 4.99  6.39 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 0.91 1.34 2.24 3.78  5.29 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+) 0.32 0.28 0.39 0.51 0.65 
female education 15+ (FED)  0.65 1.17 1.86 3.17  4.77 
Male education 15+ (ED) 1.76 2.85 3.58 5.11  6.52 
Total education 15+ (TED) 1.21 2.01 2.72 4.14  5.65 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED) 0.38 0.41 0.47 0.58  0.73 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+) 3.48 4.12 5.20 6.62  7.33 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  5.28 5.66 6.82 8.02  8.32 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 4.34 4.87 5.99 7.32  7.82 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+) 0.59 0.66 0.70 0.78 0.85 
female education 15+ (FED)  5.24 5.90 6.56 8.24  7.57 
male education 15+ (ED)  6.13 6.71 7.82 8.92  8.61 
total education 15+ (TED)  5.66 6.29 7.18 8.57  8.09   42
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED)  0.82 0.85 0.83 0.91 0.86 
Latin America and Caribbean  1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+)  2.91 3.35 4.2 5.08  5.87 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  3.42 3.93 4.65 5.42  6 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 3.16 3.63 4.42 5.25  5.94 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+) 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.98 
female education 15+ (FED)  3.3 3.88 4.81 5.52  6.08 
male education 15+ (ED)  3.69 4.3 5.09 5.73  6.27 
total education 15+ (TED)  3.49 4.09 4.95 5.62  6.18 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED)  0.9 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.96 
OECD 1960 1970 1980 1990  1999 
female education 25+ (OFED25+) 6.39 6.91 7.84 8.40  9.12 
male education 25+ (OED25+)  6.98 7.62 8.68 9.30  9.82 
total education 25+ (OTED25+) 6.66 7.25 8.24 8.83  9.46 
ratio female-male education 25+ 
(ORED25+)  0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.93 
female education 15+ (FED)  6.54 7.13 8.06 8.69  9.30 
male education 15+ (ED)  7.11 7.70 8.66 9.27  9.85 
total education 15+ (TED)  6.81 7.40 8.35 8.97  9.57 
ratio female male education 15+ 
(RED)  0.91 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 
Source: Barro-Lee (2000).  All refer to unweighted averages. 
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Table A3: Labor market Indicators by Region, 1960-2000 
 
East Asia and Pacific 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  90.69 87.82 86.41 85.71 84.94 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  66.43 67.25 69.84 71.07 72.47 
ratio female-male economic activity rate, 15-64  (RACT)  0.45  0.52  0.61  0.66  0.7 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  41.33  46.25 52.85 56.47 59.67 
female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  28.52  32.41 36.13 38.66 40.31 
female employee rate (EMPLF)      0.17 0.22 0.29  0.3 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.39  0.43  0.46  0.45 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.4  0.49  0.6  0.66 
South Asia                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  92.5 90.4 88.6  87.61  86.22 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  71.99 70.31 68.91 68.62  69.1 
ratio female-male economic activity rate,  15-64    (RACT)  0.52 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.59 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  48.61  47.84 47.22 47.88 50.87 
female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  30.71  31.28 31.82  32.9  35.28 
female employee rate (EMPLF)     0.05  0.06  0.1  0.08 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.27  0.3  0.34  0.27 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.15  0.18  0.27  0.26 
Sub Saharan Africa                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  92.65 91.34 89.75 88.59 87.49 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  80.81 79.49 78.13 77.17 76.57 
ratio female-male economic activity rate,  15-64    (RACT)  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  69.62  68.59  67.2  66.44  66.1 
female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  43.45  43.59 43.53 43.56 43.48 
female employee rate (EMPLF)      0.12 0.09 0.09 0.03 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.46  0.27  0.26  0.08 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.2  0.26  0.28  0.34 
Middle East and North Africa                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  88.84 85.39 82.03 81.02 81.21 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  55.44 54.04 53.49 54.34 57.62 
ratio female-male economic activity rate,  15-64    (RACT)  0.24 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.41 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  21.56  23.21 25.54 27.50 33.70 
Female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  19.01  21.45 23.89 25.09 28.94 
Female employee rate (EMPLF)     0.07  0.07  0.09  0.11 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.56  0.53  0.56  0.58 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.12  0.13  0.18  0.25 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  88.67 84.83 83.76 81.47 80.31 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  73.22 73.12 74.97 73.66 73.65 
ratio female-male economic activity rate,  15-64    (RACT)  0.67 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.84 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  59.42  62.18 66.24 65.85 66.97 
female share of labor force, 15-64    (FLFT)  42.49 43.46 44.74 45.13  46 
female employee rate (EMPLF)      0.25 0.38 0.41 0.31 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.51  0.62  0.55  0.44 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.45  0.57  0.68  0.6 
Latin America and Caribbean                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  91.64 88.57 86.34 85.41 84.63 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  59.55 59.45 61.12 63.43 65.78 
ratio female-male economic activity rate, 15-64  (RACT)  0.3  0.34  0.41  0.49  0.56 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  27.91  30.51 35.73 41.77 46.88 
female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  22.93  25.24 28.87 32.77 35.63   44
female employee rate (EMPLF)      0.18 0.21 0.22 0.24 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.51  0.48  0.4  0.42 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.37  0.45  0.56  0.56 
OECD                
male economic activity rate, 15-64   (MACT)  90.28 86.80 84.66 81.55 81.12 
total economic activity rate, 15-64  (TACT)  63.35 64.99 68.64 70.57 72.00 
ratio female-male economic activity rate,  15-64    (RACT)  0.41 0.50 0.62 0.73 0.77 
female economic activity rate, 15-64  (FACT)  37.32  43.16 52.72 59.36 62.82 
female share of labor force, 15-64  (FLFT)  29.45  33.11 37.96 41.48 43.06 
female employee rate (EMPLF)      0.32 0.41 0.48 0.48 
male employee rate (EMPLM)     0.65  0.64  0.62  0.59 
ratio female-male employees (REMPL)     0.48  0.62  0.75  0.79 
Source: WISTAT 3, LABORSTA (ILO Bureau of Statistics).   
Note: All refer to unweighted averages.  Employees data only until 1995.  The male and female employee rate 
refers to the numbers of dependently employed as a share of the working age population.  As it excludes self-
employment and own-account agriculture, it is therefore an indicator of the formal sector employment rate and 
has been referred to as such in the text.  The female, male and total economic activity rates refer to the 
population aged 15-64 and come from the ILO dataset on line.  
 